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ABSTRACT 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM AND CHILDCARE 
KYLE KOPPLIN 
2016 
This paper attempts to analyze the effects of subsidized food dollars on the 
amount of daily childcare in households. More specifically, households in the low income 
category are of interest because they are the most likely to receive food subsidies. There 
has been a political debate recently in the United States which argues over the appropriate 
level of subsidies, if any. More importantly, food insecurity is an issue in the world; 
many do not know where will the next meal come from. This paper provides statistical 
evidence that food subsidies in the form of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP) have a positive effect on the amount of childcare in which enrolled 
households engage. Childcare is measured in minutes per day, and SNAP assistance is 
measured in dollar assistance. These effects are analyzed both before and after the 
increases to SNAP benefits provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 (ARRA). Through the review of related literature, this paper will show that authors 
in the discipline that have done studies related to food economics and childcare argue that 
children who receive more childcare are better off later in their lives. Also, other authors 
show that SNAP enrollment can decrease food insecurity. 
Statistical analysis in this paper is done using combined datasets from the Current 
Population Survey and the American Time Use Survey and the STATA© statistical 
package. Regression analysis and statistical hypothesis tests are the main tools for 
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determining statistical significance. Models reported are an ordinary least square model 
and a two-stage least square model. Both are included in this paper because the statistical 
tests for endogeneity of the of the main explanatory variable do not provide evidence to 
support which model is more appropriate for the approximation of the partial effect of 
SNAP on childcare.  
The main conclusion found from these statistical tests is that childcare is 
positively affected at the household level by subsidized food dollars from SNAP. An 
implication is that increasing the magnitude of food subsidies in other forms may also 
have a positive impact on childcare at the household level. Future studies ought to 
examine the effects of other food subsidies in order to determine their viability in aiding 
with time households can spend in childcare. 
  
 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
 A current worldwide economic issue is food insecurity where households wonder 
where their next meal will come from. In order to counteract food insecurity, the United 
States government has enacted several food subsidy programs. The question for 
economists is whether those food subsidies actually combat food insecurity and the 
residual effects that occur inside a household. One of the negative externalities of food 
insecurity is a decrease in the quantity of daily childcare that households can engage in. 
This phenomenon occurs for several reasons as household adults make economic 
decisions to reduce food insecurity that may crowd out time spent in daily childcare. 
Food subsidies aim to reduce food insecurity, and one of the outcomes to households 
could be an increased magnitude of average daily childcare by household adults. This 
paper examines the specific economic question whether food subsidies increase the time 
that households engage in daily childcare.  
Through the course of the literature review, this paper will provide evidence that 
there are many positive aspects from children receiving more childcare in the household. 
However, most of these aspects are intangible and difficult to measure. It should not be 
trivialized that time spent in childcare provides intangible benefits. The results of this 
paper may provide evidence that food subsidies could be further pursued by policy 
makers to allow more households to experience the positive externalities.  
The new knowledge derived from this study could be used to further examine the 
effects of food subsidies in the short run and restructure government budgets for a greater 
number of households to be better off in the long run. The contribution to the economic 
knowledge stock can also be applied to other types of subsidies. Government agencies 
2 
engage in subsidies beyond food, and this paper may provide a starting point for which to 
examine how subsidies can have positive effects outside their intended goals. 
  
3 
BACKGROUND 
 Households are restricted several ways when it comes to eligibility including their 
resources, income, allowable deductions, and employment. SNAP defines a household as 
everyone who lives together and purchases and prepares meals together. These rules are 
either adjusted or ignored when the application includes a household member that is 
elderly or disabled. As far as SNAP is concerned, an elderly person is any person 60 
years of age or older. A disability is more difficult to determine so there is a set of 
considerations by SNAP to decide if a person is disabled. A person is considered disabled 
if they: 
 Receive federal disability or blindness payments under the Social Security 
Act 
 Receive state disability or blindness payments 
 Receives a disability retirement benefit from a governmental agency 
because of a permanent disability under the Social Security Act 
 Receives an annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act and is eligible for 
Medicare 
 Are a veteran who is totally disabled, permanently housebound, or in need 
of regular aid 
 Are a surviving spouse or child of a veteran who is receiving VA benefits 
and is considered to be permanently disabled 
There are upper limits on the amount of a household’s resources. There are some 
exceptions and exclusions to resources. The more exclusions, the more likely a household 
qualifies for SNAP. A household may have up to $2,250 in deposits or cash, called 
countable resources. This is increased to $3,250 if the household has at least one person 
older than 60 years old or disabled. Certain resources are not counted, such as the value 
4 
of the house or a lot. Also, resources of people who receive Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families and pension plans are non-countable. Assets such as vehicles in 
possession are handled on a state-by-state basis. In some states, the value of the 
household’s primary vehicle is excluded from assets. In other states, the market value of 
all household vehicles are considered as non-excludable. A third way states handle 
vehicles is the total exclusion of their value from household resources. The remaining 
states exempt household vehicles with higher values than the SNAP standard of $4,650 
from the fair market value to determine the countable resource value of the vehicle. 
 Perhaps the most important stipulation in determining eligibility for SNAP 
benefits in this paper is household income. Table 1 lists the allowable household income 
based on the number of people living in the household at the time of SNAP registration.  
  Table 1. SNAP Income Qualifications. 
Household 
Size 
Gross 
monthly 
income 
Net 
monthly 
income 
(130 
percent of 
poverty) 
(100 
percent of 
poverty) 
1 $1,276  $981  
2 $1,726 $1,328 
3 $2,177 $1,675 
4 $2,628 $2,021 
5 $3,078 $2,368 
6 $3,529 $2,715 
7 $3,980 $3,061 
8 $4,430 $3,408 
Each 
additional 
member 
$451 $347 
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In order to receive SNAP benefits, a household’s income must not exceed the values in 
Table 1. These income requirements are from October of 2015 and are valid through 
September of 2016. Households must meet these requirements unless all members in the 
household are receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Supplemental 
Security Income, or any general subsidized assistance in some states.  
Gross income is a household’s total income and non-excluded income before any 
allowable deductions. Net income in the gross income less the allowable deductions. A 
special note, the net income limits are higher in Alaska and Hawaii, but the Continental 
United States, the District of Columbia, and all territories follow the above guidelines for 
income. Most households need to meet both the net and gross income requirements to 
qualify, but households with at least one elderly person or at least one person who is 
receiving some types of disability payments needs only to meet the net income 
requirements. There are several deductions to income that are allowed by SNAP: 
 A 20% deduction from earned income 
 A standard deduction of $155 for households with three or less people 
 A standard deduction of $168 for households with four or more people 
 A dependent care deduction when needed for work, training, or education 
 Medical expenses for elderly or disabled household members that are 
more than $35 for the month if they are not paid by insurance or some 
other benefactor 
 Legally owed and outstanding child support payments 
 Some states allow homeless households the amount of $143 for shelter 
costs 
 Excess shelter costs that are more than half of the household’s income 
after the other deductions 
6 
o Allowable costs include the cost of fuel to heat and cook, 
electricity, water, fees for basic telephone, rent/mortgage 
payments, and taxed on the home 
o Shelter deductions cannot exceed $504 unless one person in the 
household is elderly or disabled 
 Once a household is determined to be SNAP eligible, there are caps to the amount 
of benefits a household may receive. The benefits received by households are referred to 
as allotments and apply to when the household applies for SNAP. The net monthly 
income of the household is multiplied by .3 and the product is subtracted from the 
maximum allotment for the household size to find the household’s allotment. The 30% is 
assumed to be the amount that households will allocate toward food from their own 
income. Again, the following table has values which are applicable to the contiguous 
states, the District of Columbia, and territories held by the United States and are current 
through September of 2016: 
  Table 2. SNAP Monthly Allotments. 
People in 
Household 
Maximum 
Monthly 
Allotment 
1 $   194 
2 $   357 
3 $   511 
4 $   649 
5 $   771 
6 $   925 
7 $ 1,022 
8 $1,169  
Each 
additional 
person 
$    146 
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 Employment requirements also apply to receiving SNAP benefits. These 
requirements include registering for work, not voluntarily quitting a job or asking for a 
reduction of hours, not voluntarily rejecting a job when offered, and participation in 
employment and training programs to be determined at the state level. Omission of any of 
these requirements can result in disqualification from SNAP. Also, nondisabled adults 
without dependents are required to work or be part of a work program for a minimum of 
20 hours per week for more than three months in a continuous 36-month period. Table 3 
contains the average enrollment, average benefit per person per day in dollars, and the 
magnitude of aggregate funds dedicated to SNAP: 
  Table 3. SNAP Figures for Select Years. 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation and 
Costs 
(Data as of March 4, 2016) 
  Average 
Benefit 
Per 
Person 
 
All 
Other 
Costs 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Average 
Participation 
Total 
Benefits 
Total 
Costs 
 
Thousands 
Dollars 
Per Day 
Millions ($) 
2005 25,628 3.10 28,567.88 2,504.13 31,072.01 
2006 26,549 3.16 30,187.35 2,715.72 32,903.06 
2007 26,316 3.21 30,373.27 2,800.25 33,173.52 
2008 28,223 3.41 34,608.40 3,031.25 37,639.64 
2009 33,490 4.18 50,359.92 3,260.00 53,619.92 
2010 40,302 4.46 64,702.16 3,581.30 68,283.47 
2011 44,709 4.46 71,810.92 3,875.56 75,686.49 
2012 46,609 4.45 74,619.34 3,790.34 78,409.68 
2013 47,636 4.44 76,066.32 3,806.01 79,872.32 
2014 46,664 4.17 69,998.84 4,182.82 74,181.66 
2015 45,767 4.23 69,655.43 4,326.81 73,982.24 
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 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 contains several 
governmental budget changes and resource allocations. One such change is the increase 
of monthly benefit levels of SNAP by an average of 15% and easing the constraints on 
SNAP eligibility for unemployed adults without children. Its intention is to decrease food 
insecurity through the SNAP channel and to provide jobs to those who were searching 
but still unemployed. Through these two intermediate targets, the long-run aim is to boost 
purchasing power of recipients of SNAP and thus stimulate the economy with their added 
capacity to engage in market transactions. Originally, SNAP was set to receive $20 
billion over the five years following 2009. ARRA also allocated $300 million to states in 
order to aid with the administrative costs of SNAP for the fiscal year following 2009. 
There are several other provisions of ARRA: 
 Increasing the Thrifty Food Plan and maximum monthly allotments by an 
average of 13.6% 
 Increase the minimum monthly benefit from $14 to $16 
 Eliminated the three month per three year time limit set on SNAP benefits 
for adults who had no children and did not have a disability 
o Still required to comply with the State Employment and Training 
Programs 
 Increasing state administrative funding for SNAP operations by $145 
million in 2009 and $150 million in 2010 
The reasoning behind increasing SNAP benefits as part of ARRA is that SNAP benefits 
are liquid and are therefore quickly injected back into the economy through market 
transactions. These purchases would not be possible without receiving SNAP benefits 
that ease the household budget constraint of SNAP recipients, meaning that these 
households have more disposable income with which to engage in market activity. 
9 
However, due to legislation since 2009, the $20 million increase in SNAP from 
ARRA has been diminished. The Health, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 reauthorized the 
United States Department of Agriculture’s child nutrition programs and shorted the end 
date for ARRA to increase SNAP benefits from 2019 back to 2013. In addition, funding 
allocated for Medicaid, education, and jobs crowded out ARRA increases to SNAP 
monthly benefits as of 2014. The effects of ARRA on SNAP are seen in Table 4. 
Table 4. ARRA Increase to SNAP per Day. 
 
  
Household size Daily Increase
1 $0.80
2 $1.47
3 $2.10
4 $2.67
5 $3.17
6 $3.80
7 $4.20
8 $4.80
9+ $0.60/person
ARRA Household Increase to SNAP
10 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Berger and Black (1992) examine the effects of childcare subsidies on the 
decisions of low-income mothers and on the quality of care that children in these 
situations receive. These authors use survey data from families living in Kentucky that 
were enrolled in Louisville’s 4C (Community Coordinated Childcare) and Kentucky’s 
Title XX Purchase of Care subsidy programs. Louisville’s 4C program includes female-
led households with income not more than 80% of the state median family income at the 
time of the study. Title XX is limited to an even smaller subset of low-income female-led 
households including only households with incomes not more than 60% of the state 
median family income at the time of the study. The authors selected these two programs 
because of the stratification in percentages of state median income to allow for analysis 
across income levels even in low-income households and because of the many 
similarities the two programs have in terms of qualifications and requirements. The 
authors are interested in the requirement that children must be placed in licensed day care 
centers, which must satisfy Kentucky standards for safety and health. The authors 
obtained their data through phone interviews administered to groups of recipients, or 
potential recipients on waiting lists for either subsidy program in the summer of 1989.  
To analyze the impact of the subsidy on single mothers’ labor supply decisions, 
the authors employ multiple regression analysis using the same right-hand-side variables 
to attempt to explain hours worked and employment: 
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ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
′𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛽3𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽4𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
′𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽5𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 + 𝛽6𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛
+ 𝛽7𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 + 𝛽8 log(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) +   
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
′𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛽3𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽4𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
′𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽5𝑚𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 + 𝛽6𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛
+ 𝛽7𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 + 𝛽8 log(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) +   
Berger and Black (1992) conclude from surveys that those receiving either 
subsidy responded with higher levels of satisfaction with their childcare arrangements, as 
the effect of the subsidy on satisfaction was statistically significant. The authors also 
report statistical evidence that receiving a subsidy increases employment by 11.7% for 
single mothers. There is no statistical evidence to support an effect on hours worked as 
the result of receiving a subsidy. 
Tekin (2007) examines the effects of the price of childcare and wages on part-
time and full-time employment decisions of single mothers and the choice to pay for 
childcare by single mothers. The author notes that there is literature to support that an 
increase in the cost of organized childcare has a negative effect on labor participation of 
single mothers, but there has been no agreement in the economics discipline as to the 
price elasticity of childcare on employment. The author obtains data from the 1997 
National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF). Importantly, this survey contains 
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information on childcare subsidies. Less vital, but still important, is the fact that these 
data come after large welfare reform legislation in the early and mid-1990s. To be 
eligible for federal childcare subsidies, the household income could not exceed 85% of 
the state median income for families of the same size and whose parent(s) are working. 
The model presented by Tekin (2007) is a single decision-maker framework where the 
single mother has three choices: 1) whether to work, then to work part-time or full-time, 
2) whether to pay for childcare, and 3) whether to receive a childcare subsidy if they do 
decide to pay for childcare. The mother’s indirect utility function is expressed: 
 𝑉𝑖 = 𝑿𝛽𝑖 +  𝛼𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑠
∗ +  𝛼𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑊𝑃𝑇 +  𝛼𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑊𝐹𝑇 +  𝑖 ,      𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝐽  
where W represents the wage rates for part-time and full-time employment, P* is the 
hourly price of childcare in market s, X is the vector of preferences that do not vary 
across alternatives, and β’s and α’s are the parameters to be estimated by regression 
analysis. This model demonstrates how a single mother will respond to the three decision 
criteria presented. From this framework, Tekin (2007) determines that a higher price of 
childcare reduces utility to the mother, a higher part-time wage increases utility to the 
mother if she works part-time, a higher full-time wage increases utility to the mother if 
she works full-time, and a higher childcare subsidy increases utility to the mother when 
she chooses to receive a subsidy. The author notes that using state dummy variables as 
identifying instruments in either wages or in childcare costs would be invalid if location 
affects preferences, and therefore decision-making, of single mothers. However, there are 
no alternatives that are theoretically justified in order to estimate the equation parameters. 
Tekin (2007) concludes that there is statistical evidence to support the claim that 
increasing childcare subsidy dollars increases the employment participation of single 
13 
mothers in both part-time and full-time categories. The author notes that these results do 
not provide information about the relative cost-effectiveness of childcare subsidies and 
do not answer the question of which subsidy would lead to the greatest amount of labor 
force participation by single mothers. One main conclusion from this paper is that, even 
though both categorical estimates are statistically significant, single mothers working 
full-time are more sensitive to wage increases than part-time working single mothers. 
Another conclusion is that subsidies related to childcare are likely to have a greater 
impact on labor force participation by single mothers than wage subsidies for respective 
subsets. The childcare price elasticity on employment found in this paper is smaller than 
that of similar studies done previously, namely Blau and Hagy (1998), Michalogoulos 
and Robins (2000), and Blau and Robins (1998). 
Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) attempt to demonstrate the effects of specific 
childcare arrangement decisions made by parents on the well-being of children. These 
authors argue that this relationship cannot be properly analyzed in the United States 
because the number, type, quality, and diversity of childcare arrangements makes patterns 
unmeasurable because to do so would require scalar weights to deflate and decompose 
the heterogeneity of different childcare options. To get around these data issues, the 
authors analyze data from Sweden. Sweden has a homogeneous childcare system because 
of national standards for operation. The authors argue that Sweden’s childcare market 
provides better inferences about the effects of childcare options and well-being because 
of the homogeneity of the arrangements. Sweden also provides a unique opportunity to 
study price variation as the price for homogenous childcare differs across regions.  
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The authors use data collected in a national survey for 1984 from the National 
Central Bureau of Statistics combined with municipality data on childcare fees for the 
same year published by Svenska Kommunfӧrbundet. There model is as follows: 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙 − 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
Child well-being is specified as a function of time spent in childcare by parents 
and money spent on household goods for the benefit of household children. The standard 
of living is defined as a function of money spent on goods other than for the benefit of 
household children. The authors note that subsidies lead to increased use of childcare 
outside the home and increased market participation of parents. However, the loss of in-
home child well-being need not mean the loss of child well-being altogether. That is to 
say, the well-being gained from using out-of-home childcare may be greater in magnitude 
than well-being lost from in-home childcare. 
Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) conclude that price responsiveness to using the 
childcare structure in Sweden allows for analysis to demonstrate the extent to which 
subsidies in a particular municipality influences participation in these markets. They also 
conclude that the net impact on the labor supply is close to zero because much of the 
response to subsidies comes from the substitution effect of public for private childcare, as 
subsidies in public childcare increases. The authors note that their analysis is limited due 
to diversity of family situations not including wage, income, and subsidy rate for a 
particular municipality. These differences lead to out-of-home childcare decisions that 
are attributed to lurking variables or irrational decision-making in choosing childcare. 
Hill and Stafford (1980) analyze parental time devoted to childcare during their 
preschool years to discover if differentials in social class or education of parents leads to 
15 
the transmission of income disparity intertemporally. The authors argue that 
intergenerational wealth transfers through parental time spent on childcare that affects the 
particular cognitive development of children during their preschool years. The Time Use 
Survey is used to determine the time allocated by parents to childcare. The following is a 
set of equations used to determine deviations Hit from the mean annual hours of 
housework for a woman with no children: 
 𝐻𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  ∑𝛽𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖𝑡 
𝛼𝑖𝑡 =  П1𝑍1𝑖𝑡 +  П2𝑍2𝑖𝑡 +  1𝑖𝑡 
or simplified: 
𝐻𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  ∑𝛽𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  П1𝑍1𝑖𝑡 +  2𝑖𝑡 
2𝑖𝑡 =  П2𝑍2𝑖𝑡 +  1𝑖𝑡 
The deviation from the mean number of hours spent on housework increases with 
the number of children in the household, CHit, which is divided into age groups of the 
children CHn including babies, preschoolers, grade-schoolers, and high-schoolers. Z1 is 
the vector of observed variables that are known to alter the number of hours a mother 
spends in childcare. Z2 is the vector of unobserved variables that alter the number of 
hours a mother spends in childcare. 
Hill and Stafford (1980) conclude that, because there are substantial per-child 
differences in care across all levels of parental education and income, their results are 
only circumstantial in determining the lifetime achievement of children based on their 
care early in life. However, the authors argue that their findings suggest that more-
educated parents spend more time in childcare with their children than less-educated 
parents. More-educated parents provide more market outputs to society and more time 
16 
inputs for their children as the children develop before leaving the home. The authors 
suggest, though their results are only circumstantial, that this relationship may account 
for certain types of higher functioning later in life by the child in the labor market and 
interpersonal relationships. Finally, the authors conclude that equal educational 
opportunity could provide societal benefits in subsequent generations. 
Datcher-Loury (1988) demonstrates a connection between time spent by mothers 
in childcare and the corresponding children’s outcomes as adults. The author cites 
Michael (1973) that the amount of time spent in childcare increases with the financial 
resources available to the parents and notes that the effect of schooling in economic 
literature is uniformly positive.  Datcher-Loury (1988) uses data from the University of 
Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics to analyze the effects of a mother’s time 
spent in childcare on their children’s years of schooling. In this framework, the child 
makes the decision to pursue schooling partly based on their care early in life and partly 
based on the magnitude of financial investment made, if any, by the parent with their 
perception of schooling quality. The framework assumes that the child would choose the 
school where the marginal cost of the investment is equal to the marginal benefit of the 
schooling. The dataset used provides information on annual hours of housework time 
spent by mothers but does not directly specify the time spent in childcare. The author 
uses a variant of the method used by Hill and Stafford (1980) to get at time spent in 
childcare. Based on this model, the author reasons that differences in the mean value of 
αit across time includes individual-specific variations in time mothers spend in childcare. 
Datcher-Loury (1988) uses this metric as a proxy variable for time spent in childcare by 
mothers not explicitly included in the dataset and uses the following model: 
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𝛼𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1#𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑(0 − 2) + 𝛽2#𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑(3 − 5) + 𝛽3#𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑(6 − 13)
+ 𝛽4#𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑(14 − 17) + 𝛽5𝑀𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
′𝑠 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽6𝐹𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
′𝑠 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ
+ 𝛽8𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
′𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒
+ 𝛽10𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒(𝑓𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
′𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)  
+  𝛽11𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 +  𝑖 
The author then uses the estimates for αi as a parameter in a model to predict the 
years of schooling a child will have based on maternal childcare received before leaving 
the home. 
𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 =  𝑋𝑖𝛿1 +  𝛿2𝛼𝑖 +  3𝑖 
Schooling of a child is a function of maternal childcare estimated above and the vector Xi 
which includes years of both father’s and mother’s years of schooling, whether the father 
was a white collar worker during the period, mean real family income, whether the 
mother was less than 19 when she birthed the first child, whether the parents expected 
their child to attend college, number of siblings, and maternal employment. The last two 
variables are commonly used proxies for childcare time spent by mothers. To avoid 
inconsistency and bias with ordinary least square estimates, an instrumental variable 
approach was used in the multiple regression analysis. However, the differences in errors 
between OLS and IV are found to be insignificant.  
Datcher-Loury (1988) concludes that maternal childcare time increases with 
maternal home productivity and decreases with rising opportunity costs of increasing 
potential wages. The author also concludes that maternal childcare time increases 
children’s years of schooling supported by statistical evidence. This paper limits the 
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dataset to mothers who have at least twelve years of schooling. The outcomes found in 
this paper may differ because of variance in maternal home productivity across 
educational groups. The fourth conclusion is that the existence of sibling children in the 
same age group or one age group older has negative effects on the years of schooling for 
a particular child. However, these findings are generally small and nearly statistically 
insignificant. 
Kohler, Behrman, and Skytthe (2005) explain that both being in partnerships with 
a significant other and having children increases utility to the parents. To do this, the 
authors analyze the debate on the validity of conceptual framework that states: “Partner + 
Children = Happiness.” This framework makes two key assumptions, the first is that 
agents do not have misconceptions about the impacts of partnerships and fertility on their 
happiness, and the second is that these agents make conscious and informed decisions 
when it comes to these choices. By fertility, the authors note that there is an emphasis on 
biological children, not those attained from adoption or any other avenue. The above 
simple equation is challenged on the grounds that happiness is primarily determined by 
genetic factors that affect personality and other predispositions. Proponents on this side 
of the debate, typically psychologists, argue that chance events severely affect happiness, 
but do not persist to affect long-run happiness. That is to say that happiness is relatively 
stable over an individual’s lifetime, but there are deviations based on life events that 
affect only the short-run. 
The authors of this paper control for data limitations by using a dataset from 
Denmark that includes monozygotic twins that were asked survey questions about their 
relative well-being and their socioeconomics and demographic experiences. This dataset 
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is used to control for certain unobserved endowments and genetic predispositions that 
would affect happiness were the respondents genetically different. Based on this, causal 
interpretations can be made from the data on the relative well-being of agents based on 
their partnership status and if they have children.  
The data used in from the Danish Twin Registry, a nationwide database 
established in 1954 and the first in the world. The Registry conducted a survey in 2002 
on twins that were born between the years on 1931 and 1982 addressing issues of health, 
socioeconomic characteristics, number of biological children and age at which the parent 
had their first child, and partnership behaviors including the number of and age at which 
the respondent was married. The survey was arranged to measure subjective well-being 
by having the respondents rank their satisfaction with their lives from “very satisfied” to 
“not satisfied at all” for two different age groups, 25 to 45 and 50 to 70 years of age. The 
authors use these two age groups to demonstrate categories of individuals who are and 
are not in their childbearing years. The authors note that Scandinavian countries have 
decreased the importance of the distinction between marriage and cohabitation, and the 
twin survey treats the two relationship arrangements the same under the name 
“partnership” in the data.  
A problem in estimating causal relationships between partnerships and fertility on 
happiness is that unobserved endowments may be endogenous. Using the twin dataset, 
the authors are able to control for the unobserved endowments using a differential 
approach in their regression equation from one twin to the other. The authors argue that 
twins share the same genetic endowments and socioeconomic upbringing that affect 
emotional predispositions to happiness. This way, the causal effects of differences in 
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partnership arrangements and fertility on subjective happiness is exogenous in multiple 
regression analysis. The model for twin i in pair j is as follows: 
𝐻𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗 
where Partner refers to partnership behavior of twin i, and Fertility refers to fertility 
behavior of twin i, µ is the unobserved endowments that are common to twins in pair j, 
and ε is a randomly distributed variable that reflects other unobserved factors of 
happiness not described in the regression equation. The differential regression equation is 
then as follows: 
𝛥𝐻𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗 = 𝛽1𝛥𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗 + 𝛽2𝛥𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝑗 
where the Δ terms are differentials in twin pair j. Without using a differential approach, 
the estimates of β1 and β2 are biased, especially in survey data. 
Kohler, Behrman, and Skytthe (2005) conclude that parental happiness is 
influenced little by the normal variables such as income, education, and occupation. 
Instead, happiness seems to depend most on personality characteristics, genetic 
predispositions, and socioeconomic background. Partnership status is a primary aspect of 
subjective happiness for both men and women in both age ranges. An important finding, 
first-born children have a larger effect on subjective happiness of parents than subsequent 
children. Also, fertility does not seem to affect the happiness gained by parents from their 
partnership arrangement. The authors note that first-born children before the parents’ age 
of 21 reduces subjective happiness in the long run. 
Kenney (2008) demonstrates that children in households with pooled income from 
both a mother and a father are less likely to experience food insecurity when the finances 
are exclusively allocated by the mother. The author bridges a gap in the literature where 
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the gender of the parent who controls the household finances is a determining factor of 
the food security of the children in that household. Data for this study comes from two 
components of the Fragile Families Child Wellbeing study: the Core Survey and the In-
Home Survey.  
Kenney (2008) answers two test questions, the first being whether children are 
more or less food secure when the mother controls the finances in low-income and 
moderate-income two-parent households in the United States. The second question is a 
test that measures sensitivity in a child’s food security to their father’s involvement in the 
allocation of finances. The author notes that there are two possible reasons for variations 
in food security based on the gender of the parent who controls the finances. The first is 
that opposite-gendered parents make different choices in the type of food they buy, 
particularly children’s food. A father may be have less knowledge of what types of child-
specific foods are needed to best provide nutrition to children, leading to a quality 
deficiency in the food that is purchased. Alternatively, fathers may simply misallocate the 
appropriate amount of household resources to food, leaving a quantity deficiency for the 
children to eat. 
Multiple regression analysis is used to test the author’s hypotheses that gender 
matters in resource allocation of household resources for food security subject to the 
following models: 
𝐴𝑛𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
= 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒔
+ 𝛽2𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔 + 𝛽3𝑴𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓
′𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔
+ 𝛽4𝑭𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓
′𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔 +   
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𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
= 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒔
+ 𝛽2𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔 + 𝛽3𝑴𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓
′𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔
+ 𝛽4𝑭𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓
′𝒔 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔 +   
The author first determines the existence, if any, of food insecurity based on the 
first equation. Then the extent of the food insecurity is determined in the second equation 
using the standard USDA children’s food security scale as the dependent variable, a 
continuous measure demonstrating the severity of food insecurity of a child. All the 
variable names listed in the equations above are vectors containing groupings of related 
variables. Management of household resources represents five dummy variables that 
determine which parent controls the household resources and the extent to which there is 
joint control. Household characteristics represents the household-poverty ratio, material 
hardship index, if the household is receiving WIC or food stamps, the proportion of the 
household income attributed to the mother, if the parents are cohabitating, the number of 
adults in the household, the number of children in the household, and the relationship 
quality index. Mother’s characteristics represents age, race, foreign born, existence of 
substance abuse, and existence of a child(ren) with another partner. Father’s 
characteristics represents the existence of substance abuse, existence of a child(ren) with 
another partner, existence of violence toward mother, and extent of involvement in 
childcare. 
Kenney (2008) concludes that the probability of a child experiencing food 
insecurity is more likely in low-income and moderate-income households when the father 
makes allocation decisions, either in full or in part. The results of this study support with 
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statistical evidence that children are more likely to be food secure when the mother 
makes resource allocation decisions autonomously from the father. In some model 
variants, the likelihood of food insecurity is 2.5 times as high when the father is the 
exclusive decision maker.  
The author notes that women, particularly in the United States, are perceived as 
being held more accountable for food than men. This study supports this gender 
stereotype with statistical evidence. Mothers are more likely to spend money on food 
when they are making allocation decisions, leading to greater food security for the 
children in the household. The author expected to find that increasing the father’s 
involvement in childcare would increase food security, but the results did not support this 
hypothesis. Kenney (2008) reasons that fathers often engage in childcare activities of 
young children to keep them out of the way of the mother while she is engaging in food 
preparation, meaning that gender roles in the household still point to the mother bearing 
most of the burden of providing food security. The author acknowledges a shortcoming in 
the dataset as it only includes heterosexual parents living in urban areas with at least one 
preschool age child that the parents care for jointly. A possible extension of this paper 
would be to examine particular food subsidy programs that focus on nutrition of children 
so that even when the father makes allocation decision, the probability of food insecurity 
is decreased. 
Frongillo, Jyota, and Jones (2006) aim to determine if participation in the Food 
Stamp Program (FSP) leads to outcomes in a child’s performance in school and health, 
namely reading, mathematics, weight gain, and social skills. The FSP is one of several 
federal food assistance programs in the United States, the main goal of which is to reduce 
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food insecurity. The authors note that participation in these subsidy programs is by self-
selection and it is therefore difficult to distinguish between a causal effect of the 
programs that would reduce food insecurity and the selection effects of choosing to be a 
participant. Longitudinal data over a four year period of childhood development is used 
in the place of cross-sectional data in order to tease out the magnitudes of the causal and 
selection effects and reduce bias. 
Data for this study comes from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-
Kindergarten cohort from 1998 to 1999, which is a nationally representative sample for 
analysis. The USDA’s Household Food Security Survey Module is used as the measure 
for food insecurity. Mathematics and reading scores were measured in kindergarten and 
again in the third grade. Heights and weights were also recorded. Social skills were 
measured using teacher evaluations of the children for a variety of behaviors that capture 
social skills, learning abilities, and self-control. The authors employ a differential model 
to test their hypotheses based on the following equations: 
∆𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒3−𝐾 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1∆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔3−𝐾 +  𝛽2∆𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦3−𝐾
+  𝛽3∆𝐹𝑆𝑃 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3−𝐾 + 𝐸 
∆𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒3−𝐾 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1∆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔3−𝐾 +  𝛽2∆𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑3−𝐾
+  𝛽3∆𝐹𝑆𝑃 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3−𝐾 +  𝛽4∆𝐹𝑆𝑃 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛3−𝐾
∗ ∆𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑3−𝐾 + 𝐸 
The composite need in the second equation is a continuous measure for material 
hardship, and β4 is the coefficient for the interaction term between participation in the 
Food Stamp Program and material hardship. Covariates is a vector representing the 
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differentials in reading and mathematics scores, height and weight, and social skill 
development measures. 
Frongillo, Jyota, and Jones (2006) conclude that children in households that 
started to engage in FSP participation had less weight gain than children in households 
that had ceased FSP participation, contrary to the expected result of the authors. 
However, this result is not statistically significant. The results show an increase in 
academic measures of children participating in FSP. The authors reason that this could be 
the result of improved quality or quantity of nutritious food. However, there is not 
enough evidence to support a causal relationship between FSP participation and better 
nutrition, only that FSP increases the availability of nutritional substances. 
Nord and Golla (2009) estimate the effects of the Supplemental Nutritional 
Assistance Program (SNAP), previously FSP, on the food security of those participating 
in the program. The authors note that there is a data anomaly whereby food insecurity is 
more prevalent in households that participate in SNAP than other qualifying households 
that do not. They reason that those households that enroll in SNAP are more likely to 
enroll when they are in desperate in their need for food and these observations are not 
taken into account by econometricians and data analysts. Nord and Golla (2009) claim to 
provide, in greater detail, information on the timing of household enrollment in SNAP 
based on their level of food insecurity at the time of their initial participation. To handle 
this selection data issue, the authors analyze the months following enrollment into SNAP 
instead of before. 
Data for this study comes from USDA food security surveys with supplementary 
sections to the Current Population Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau from 
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2001 to 2006. The authors hypothesize that SNAP eases the burden of food insecurity in 
the months after beginning enrollment in the subsidy. Each household is assessed over a 
two year period in order to decompose the timing effects of self-selection into the 
program. Statistical tests are performed using logistic regression with food insecurity of 
each year, respectively, as dependent variables to determine if SNAP reduced food 
insecurity over the time of enrollment. The authors note that SNAP enrollment may have 
seasonal pattern that would distort the results, so the model uses household member 
composition and annual household income as controls. 
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 1
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃
2
+  𝛽3𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 +  𝛽4𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 +   
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 2
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃
2
+  𝛽3𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 +  𝛽4𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 +   
Household composition is a vector that represents the number of adults in the 
household, and the number of children in the household, and the absence of either parent. 
Household income is a vector that represents different levels of income as a percentage to 
the poverty line. 
Nord and Golla (2009) conclude that food insecurity increases for households 
seven or eight months leading up to their entry to the SNAP program. After enrolling in 
SNAP, drastic food insecurity decreased, but then remained stable for the next ten 
months. This demonstrates the self-selection hypothesis and a causal relationship 
between decreasing food insecurity and SNAP enrollment. The authors note that there is 
27 
a possibility that the causal relationship may be threatened if SNAP acts as a marker for 
households that have recently experienced drastic food insecurity. These marked 
households may experience an increase in food security due to some other externality 
associated with being enrolled in the SNAP program or that their food insecurity function 
has a positive first derivative and a negative second derivative after becoming 
participants in the program. 
Burgstahler, Gundersen, and Garasky (2012) seek to determine if SNAP 
participation increases obesity in children to those enrolled in the program. This study 
expands on previous studies because it controls for household financial stress, which can 
be a cause of childhood obesity. Financial stress, the authors argue, causes changes in the 
behavior of the parents and alters the environment in which children develop. Gatasky et 
al. (2009) demonstrate that exposure to household stress is correlated with childhood 
obesity by avenues of subconscious psychological responses that influence changes in 
diet and exercise. One of the hypotheses of this study is that participation in SNAP 
reduces the amount of household level financial stress that can negatively affect children 
and in turn cause weight gain. The model is as follows using two-stage least square 
multiple regression methodology:  
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖
∗ +  𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 +  𝛾𝑿𝑖 + 𝑖 
and 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 +  𝛾𝒁𝑖 +  𝑖 
The data for this study comes from the Survey of Household Finances and 
Childhood Obesity in 2009 to 2010, a survey which focuses particularly on financial 
stress. The observations are composed of low-income metro and non-metro counties in 
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Illinois, Iowa, and Michigan. Survey data are collected in two phases, first by phone 
interviews and second by mailed surveys measuring height and weight of children of 
households participating in SNAP. The authors note that this dataset is useful because it 
has stratified levels of financial stress, county level SNAP participation rates, and 
children’s height, weight, and a derivation of body mass index percentiles. The measure 
of financial stress is derived from the survey data with six specific objective questions 
about day-to-day living limited to time spent in the household. This makes for discrete 
measures of financial stress (from 1 to 6), which are then used as weights for the stress 
experience. 
The authors use geographic information from the dataset about the county of 
residence for particular participants in SNAP as an instrumental variable for the SNAP 
variable in the analysis. Their reasoning is that high SNAP participation rates for a 
particular county ought to be highly correlated with an individual household’s decision to 
enroll in SNAP because the level of the negative stigma associated with receiving food 
subsidies is diminished relative to that in counties with low SNAP participation rates. 
Also, there would be more outreach of the SNAP program in counties with high 
participation and more availability of information about the program and receiving of its 
benefits. SNAP participation rates are affected greatly by factors such as unemployment 
rate, median income, percentage of population in respective minorities, and county-level 
need for food subsidies to decrease food insecurity. These are also used as controls in the 
model.  
The vectors X and Z refer to standard sets of covariates that are common in 
literature including education level, household income, health insurance status, race, 
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ethnicity, household size, and marital status. The sample data are restricted to households 
that qualify to receive SNAP benefits, however, not all qualifying households will choose 
to enroll for the SNAP program. Because the study is on children in particular, the 
authors also remove observations where the only children in qualifying households are 
under the age of two as there is no general consensus about how to uniformly measure 
body mass index in children of that age. Before drawing conclusions, the authors test the 
validity of their instrumental variables for SNAP. Based on the Sargan chi-squared 
statistic and the Basmann chi-squared statistic, the tests provide no statistical evidence 
that the chosen instruments are invalid or introduce endogeneity. 
Burgstahler, Gundersen, and Garasky (2012) conclude that SNAP participation is 
negatively associated with obesity in children in low-income households in counties in 
Illinois, Iowa, and Michigan. These results are found both before and after controlling for 
household financial stress. This study was pursued in response to other studies done that 
showed evidence suggesting that SNAP led to childhood obesity, but these results show 
evidence to disprove those assertions and support the opposite claim, that SNAP 
enrollment decreases childhood obesity for participating households. The authors note 
possible extensions would be to consider the relationships between financial stress using 
longitudinal data to tease out dynamic relationships over time. This research would be 
enriched by using a larger dataset with more observations from a larger geographic 
region. Lastly, the dataset used in this study was limited to those households that would 
likely be experiencing financial stress. The get a more general picture, the data should be 
allowed to include observations from households that are not perceived by the researchers 
as being predisposed to financial stress. 
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Nord and Prell (2011) aim to demonstrate that food security of households with 
incomes within 130% of the poverty level (SNAP eligible) increased from 2008 to 2009 
with most of the increase attributed to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009. To conduct their study, the authors analyze data on SNAP participation, food 
insecurity, household spending on food, and household characteristics from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) Food Security Supplement (FSS). The annual FSS survey 
augments the monthly CPS survey conducted by the USDA. The survey is administered 
by the U.S. Census Bureau. In 2009, 46,000 households participated in the survey and 
consisted of civilian, noninstitutionalized people in the United States. The following table 
shows how monthly SNAP benefits are increased by ARRA from 2008 to 2009 from 
Nord and Prell (2011). 
 Table 5. Maximum Monthly SNAP benefits pre-ARRA and post-ARRA 
   
Data on SNAP participation, SNAP benefits, food spending, and food security in 
December 2009 are compared to the corresponding statistics for December 2008. The 
2009 data was collected about eight months after ARRA went into effect so there would 
be households that would have gone through the eight month survey period completely 
Number of 
People in the 
SNAP 
Household
Pre-ARRA in 
fiscal 2009
Post-ARRA
Arra increase 
in mazimum 
monthly SNAP 
benefits
1 $176 $200 $24
2 $323 $367 $44
3 $463 $526 $63
4 $588 $668 $80
5 $698 $793 $95
6 $838 $952 $114
7 $926 $1,052 $126
8 $1,058 $1,202 $144
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since ARRA was enacted. Several income categories are analyzed in this study including 
all low-income households, low-income households that were participating in SNAP, and 
households whose income exceeds the maximum for SNAP enrollment but is less than 
the U.S. median income. Multivariate regression methods with controls for changes in 
income, employment, and other household characteristics are employed to analyze the 
partial effects from 2008 to 2009. 
The authors examine three interrelated outcomes: SNAP participation, food 
expenditures, and food security. These outcomes are then tested for consistency against 
the desired outcomes of the ARRA increases to SNAP. The effects of the low-income 
households are compared to the effects of households that the authors define as “near 
SNAP eligible”, meaning that their income exceeds 150% of the poverty line but does not 
exceed 250% of the poverty line. In this way, the near SNAP eligible households are not 
low-income but are still well below the national median income. The authors analyze data 
from 2001 to 2009 to capture some pre-recession data as well as post-ARRA data for a 
broad cross-section of economic environmental factors. Data complications occur in the 
form of the self-selection bias inherent with SNAP enrollment and under-reporting of 
SNAP participation of households enrolled due to the perceived negative stigma of 
receiving SNAP benefits.  
The key variables in this study are income, low-income and near-SNAP-eligible 
status, SNAP participation, Thrifty Food Plan-adjusted food expenditures, and food 
security. Unadjusted multivariate comparisons are used and employ medians instead of 
means because medians provide more robust measurement errors, which is particularly 
relevant to food expenditure data. These are mostly used as a naïve baseline. Adjusted 
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multivariate comparisons are used to account for any household-specific circumstances 
independent of ARRA’s increase to SNAP benefits from year to year. These models 
control for income, employment and labor force status, household composition and 
structure, presence of an elderly person(s), race and ethnicity, citizenship status, 
education level of the most highly educated adult in the household, metropolitan 
residential status, and geographic region. Difference-in-difference comparisons are also 
employed in this study to control for factors that are not-household specific from year to 
year independent of ARRA’s increase to SNAP benefits. The authors note that a change 
in food prices could affect food security to a household but would have nothing to do 
with the household specifically, thus skewing the results. 
Nord and Prell (2011) conclude that food security of low-income households 
improved from 2008 to 2009. Their results suggest that ARRA’s increase to SNAP 
benefits was a substantial factor for the decrease in food insecurity between the two years 
in the study. This result is further supported because households with income that 
exceeds the level of SNAP eligibility did not see a decrease in food insecurity between 
2008 and 2009. Another conclusion of this study is that SNAP enrollment demonstrates a 
decrease in food insecurity. The authors decomposed the changes in food security related 
to SNAP enrollment between two factors that work in opposing directions. Firstly, there 
is a self-selection bias to SNAP enrollment. Second, households with a greater disparity 
between their resources and their needs are more likely to enroll in SNAP to diminish the 
gap to cover their needs. Because of these two forces, the evidence that ARRA decreased 
food insecurity to those enrolled in SNAP is to be considered a vast improvement in the 
effectiveness of the program. The authors note that their findings question the adequacy 
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of SNAP benefits before ARRA because of the large, positive effect suggested by the 
study that ARRA had on reducing food insecurity. The authors suggest that “adequacy” is 
difficult to define with a national food supplement program as different regions have 
different local food prices, different household needs, and each household’s capacity to 
manage their resources is different. However, the overall conclusion is that SNAP 
benefits prior to 2009 still have a substantial benefit to households who received SNAP 
benefits. 
In aggregate, the literature supports that childcare is important, not only to the 
well-being of the children, as cited in Gustafsson and Stafford (1992), but also in the 
level of market output that the parents provide, as supported by Tekin (2007) and Berger 
and Black (1992). Hill and Stafford (1980) demonstrate that the quality of childcare 
greatly affects the potential market participation and output of children, so a high 
standard of childcare is important to the ability of children to become productive 
members of society in adulthood. Datcher-Loury (1988) supports the findings of Hill and 
Stafford (1980) and shows that not only does quality childcare allow for productivity 
increases later in life, but when the mother is the primary childcare provider, her 
nonmarket productivity increases. Kohler, Behrman, and Skytthe (2005) demonstrate that 
children are positive attributes to the utility of parents.  
Food insecurity can be reduced, as demonstrated by Nord and Golla (2009) and 
Nord and Prell (2011), by enrollment in the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance 
Program, both before and after 2009, and by the mother of the household making 
resource allocation decisions as it comes to food based on the findings of Kenney (2008). 
Not only can food insecurity be reduced by enrollment in SNAP, formerly the Food 
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Stamp Program, but the nutritional value of the food available to children in this program 
increases as demonstrated by Frongillo, Jyota, and Jones (2006). In addition to Frongillo, 
et al. (2006), Burgstahler, Gundersen, and Garasky (2012) provide statistical evidence 
that SNAP enrollment is negatively associated with childhood obesity to those children 
enrolled. Overall, childcare is important, which can be augmented with a subsidy like 
SNAP in order to provide food security and increased nutritional availability to children. 
No previous research examines the effect of SNAP enrollment directly on non-
pecuniary household resource allocation decisions, including the childcare provided to 
children by household adults. This paper contributes by showing a positive statistical 
relationship between enrollment in SNAP and nonmarket work done by parents that 
benefits children in the household. 
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Consider that individual households have utility functions that are an aggregation 
of the utility of all household members that are increasing in consumption and leisure: 
𝑈 = 𝑓(𝐶, 𝐿) 
This utility function U is optimized by the household in order to maximize utility, 
constrained by the household’s budget constraint: 
𝐶 = 𝑤(𝑇 − 𝐿) + 𝑉 
where C is consumption by the household of goods spent in dollars, T is total hours in the 
time period of the analysis, L is hours of leisure, w is the wage rate, and V is other 
household income earned in (T-L) hours. Other household income includes infusions, like 
subsidies, to the household’s income. The constraint is increasing in V. Thus, any other 
income shifts the budget constraint out, allowing for greater levels of consumption and 
leisure when the model is solved. Leisure hours also include non-market activities, work 
or otherwise. To be a non-market work activity, the household agent does not receive a 
wage for work being done, typically household work. Rearranging the budget constraint 
yields the following equation: 
𝑤𝑇 + 𝑉 = 𝐶 + 𝑤𝐿 
This algebraic transformation is useful because it shows how much a household 
would produce in terms of wages if all available hours were used for work. This rewritten 
budget constraint also shows that every hour of leisure costs w, the wage rate. The 
constrained maximization problem can be solved using a Lagrange multiplier approach: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥Ω = 𝑈(𝐶, 𝐿) +  𝜆(𝑤𝑇 + 𝑉 − 𝐶 − 𝑤𝐿) 
36 
However, there may also exist a perceived negative stigma from SNAP enrollment which 
diminished the utility of the household. Since the stigma, W, is dependent on SNAP 
enrollment, W is a function of SNAP. The stigma is added to the Langrangian as follows: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥Ω = 𝑈(𝐶, 𝐿) − 𝑊(𝑆) +  𝜆(𝑤𝑇 + 𝑉 − 𝐶 − 𝑤𝐿) 
It is important to note that households can have more than one wage-receiving 
agent. These cases can be expanded mathematically to accommodate that different 
household agents can receive differing wage rates by adjusting the household budget 
constraint, but the process to the solution remains the same. The Lagrangian method 
chooses the levels of consumption and leisure that maximize household utility subject to 
the budget constraint. It stands to reason that neither using all hours for work nor using 
all hours for leisure optimizes the objective function. 
In order to have money for consumption, agents in a household need to do market 
work in order to earn a wage. Working, in itself, is assumed to provide disutility to 
agents, who derive their utility from the consumption the working provides. The 
assumption that work provides disutility would not hold if the agents experience greater 
utility from working than from the wages their hours working provide. 
The utility function for households can be expanded to accommodate the 
inclusion of household children and is as follows: 
𝑈 = 𝑓[𝐶, 𝐿, 𝑊𝐵(𝐶, 𝐿)] 
where WB is the well-being of the household children, defined as follows: 
𝑊𝐵 = 𝑓(𝐶, 𝐿) 
WB is a function of C, household consumption, and L, the amount of leisure 
household adults spend on household children. Children attain a higher state of well-
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being as more nonmarket hours of the household’s adults are spent on them. For this 
reason, the household utility function for households with children is increasing in WB. 
Next, consider a household with children that receives a subsidy in the form of 
SNAP benefits, the constraint is the same except S is added to V to specify that at least 
part of other income in the constraint is in the form of a subsidy.  
𝐶 = 𝑤(𝑇 − 𝐿) + 𝑉 + 𝑆 
Receiving a subsidy eases the household budget constraint and allows a 
household to achieve a greater level of utility in equilibrium since the constraint is 
increasing in both V and S. The constrained maximization problem is again solved with 
the Lagrange multiplier approach with the expanded objective function and the rewritten 
budget constraint: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥Ω = 𝑈[𝐶, 𝐿, 𝑊𝐵(𝐶, 𝐿)] − 𝑊(𝑆) +  𝜆(𝑤𝑇 + 𝑉 + 𝑆 − 𝐶 − 𝑤𝐿) 
The central question in this framework is how the well-being variable in 
households with children is affected when at least part of other income is in the form on a 
subsidy. More narrowly, how does receiving SNAP benefits, a subsidy, affect the well-
being of children in the household? 
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EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT 
The data for this analysis are from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) 
merged with data from the Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement (CPS) 
using years 2005 to 2013. Both of these surveys are conducted by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS). The Food Security Supplement portion of the CPS collects information 
regarding household food expenditure, food assistance participation, food security, ways 
that households cope with food security, and household concern about food insecurity.  
The universe for the CPS includes households that are above 185% of the poverty 
line and below. Households that are deemed to be food insecure are then asked the 
supplementary questions pertaining specifically to food. Interviewers direct their 
questions toward the member of the household who buys and prepares the food, if 
possible. There are approximately 60,000 households that are surveyed every month. 
About one-eighth of the households exit the sample each month after their eighth CPS 
interview attempt.  
ATUS aims to measure how Americans divide their time during a typical day for 
all of life’s activities. One such activity that people spend time on is childcare. 
Demographic information is also attained during the survey process. ATUS covers all 
American residents that are at least fifteen years of age, excluding active military and 
those institutionalized in nursing homes, permanent rehabilitation facilities, and prisons. 
The ATUS sample is drawn from the CPS so the universe for the two datasets is the 
same.  
The ATUS sample is a three-stage stratified selection process from the CPS. The 
first selection stage is a reduction of the CPS oversample in the less-populated states. The 
39 
CPS has a reliability requirement for each state, meaning that less-populated states are 
allocated a larger proportion of the national CPS sample than they would get with 
national reliability requirement. This increases the reliability of the estimates at both state 
and national levels. ATUS does not have a state reliability requirement. To improve the 
efficiency of the national estimates, the CPS sample is subsampled to derive the ATUS 
sample which is distributed across states approximately equal to the proportion of the 
national population each state represents.  
The second selection stage stratifies households based on various demographic 
characteristics of the households including race/ethnicity, age and presence of children, 
and the number of adults in households without children. Sampling rates vary across 
strata. To increase the reliability of time-use data, the eligible households with a Hispanic 
or non-Hispanic black households are oversampled. To ensure appropriate measures of 
childcare, households with children are also oversampled. To accommodate the 
oversampling of households with children, households without children are 
undersampled.  
In the final selection stage, an eligible person from each household selected from 
the second stage is randomly selected to be the designated person for ATUS. Eligibility is 
defined as a member of a civilian household at least 15 years of age. All eligible persons 
within a sample household have an equal probability of being selected as the designated 
person for ATUS.  
After 2003, the ATUS sample was reduced by 35% in order to bring costs down 
to an acceptable amount based on the annual survey budget. The same proportion of each 
stratum was removed in order to make the reduction. This somewhat reduced the 
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accuracy of the estimates for the smaller groups, but the precision loss was eased as the 
group size increased. Since 2003, response rates have averaged 54.7% on an annual basis. 
Secondary activities are defined by ATUS as activities that are done concurrently with a 
more important, or primary, activity. With the exception of childcare, no secondary 
activities are compiled by the ATUS.  
The ATUS, and therefore the CPS, is edited after the raw data collection in order 
to produce usable datasets. The most common edit is to deal with item nonresponses, 
missing variables in otherwise completed questionnaires. Simply ignoring missing values 
leads to biased estimates in analysis. To handle missing data, a response is imputed one 
of three ways in order to make full questionnaires and complete datasets. The BLS 
discloses that imputation can lead to overstatement of the precision of estimates. The first 
imputation method is relational imputation which infers the missing value based on 
characteristics from others in the same household. Most commonly, this edit is used to fill 
in demographic information. The second imputation method is longitudinal assignments 
which uses the final month of CPS data to determine whether a value exists and what 
assignment the value should be given. This is typically used on labor force edits. The 
final imputation method is hot-deck allocation which implies missing values using 
records with similar characteristics. This is similar to relational imputation but not using 
data from within the same household and is most commonly used on labor force edits 
where longitudinal assignments cannot be used. The edits that are shared by both the CPS 
and the ATUS are labor force status edits, industry/occupation edits, and earnings edits. 
The edits that differ in the CPS and the ATUS are household demographic edits and 
school enrollment edits. 
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The subsample used for the regression analysis limits the sample to households 
that have household income below 130% of the poverty line for each year in the time 
series. Because the poverty line is determined by how many residents are in the 
household of a particular respondent, the poverty line increases as the number of 
household residents increases. The poverty line also moves depending on the current 
economic climate in any particular year. Therefore, respondents with the same number of 
residents in their house and the same household income in different years are not 
guaranteed to both be part of the subsample in this process. In this paper, the subsample 
of those below 130% of the poverty line is coded in STATA© as sample130. This 
subsample was chosen because respondents need to be within 130% of the poverty line as 
one of the qualifications for receiving SNAP benefits. In order to determine 130% of the 
poverty line, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used to deflate each year in the time 
series using 2013 as the base year. 
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MODEL 
The dependent variable used in this model is the minutes of daily childcare that 
respondents spend in primary childcare with their own children that are living in the same 
house and are not classified as adults. Primary childcare is defined by the CPS as time 
spent actively participating in activities with children, individuals who are less than 18 
years old, or taking care of their basic needs. Changing diapers and playing games with 
children are examples of primary childcare. This differs from secondary childcare which 
CPS defines as time respondents spend with their children but are not actively engaging 
in activities with the child. An example would be watching television while a child plays 
in the same room.  
The explanatory model employs some basic demographic information as right-
hand-side variables including age and sex. Age is an integer variable with discrete values. 
Sex is coded as a dummy variable where a value of 0 is male and a value of 1 is female. 
If these dummy values were to be scaled up by one, they would not affect the 
interpretation of the estimates because they would still be binary in nature. Marital status 
is included in the model with four interaction variables that incorporate the existence of 
children and the involvement of the spouse. Other variables included are employment 
status and the existence of multiple jobs. The two are related, but distinctly different. 
Clearly, if the employment status of a respondent is unemployed, that same respondent 
will not be able to have multiple jobs. It stands to reason that if a respondent does not 
have a job, that respondent cannot have more than one job. The income variable is 
measured as the midpoint of the stratified categories of the average household income. 
Household size is the number of people living in a respondent’s household. The variables 
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about employment relate to childcare through the avenue of the need of a respondent to 
outsource their childcare to daycare centers. Likewise, the income variable has 
explanatory power for respondents’ ability to pay a center for childcare. The summary 
statistics are reported in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Definition Full Sample Subsample 
variable name 
STATA© coding N Mean N Mean 
      (Std.Dev.)   (Std.Dev.) 
childcare 
daily childcare 
1,186,760 
31.7635 
783,136 
32.6098 
(minutes)   (79.3943) (80.0868) 
snapdoll 
SNAP assistance  
47,321 
14.9589 
8,317 
67.1445 
($)   (69.6135) (136.3850) 
age  
age of respondent 
1,186,760 
46.5943 
783,136 
46.5241 
    (17.6618) (17.6699) 
sex 
0 if male   
1,186,760 
0.5634 
783,136 
0.5637 
1 if female (0.4960) (0.4959) 
marrwsp 
1 if respondent is 
1,186,760 
0.4960 
783,136 
0.4795 
married and living with (0.5000) (0.4996) 
spouse, 0 otherwise     
marrwosp 
1 if respondent is 
1,186,760 
0.0142 
783,136 
0.0155 
married and living without (0.1183) (0.1236) 
spouse, 0 otherwise     
marrwspchild 
1 if respondent is married, 
1,186,760 
  
783,136 
  
has household, 0.2924 0.2946 
children and living (0.4549) (0.4558) 
with spouse, 0 otherwise     
marrwospchild 
1 if respondent is married, 
1,186,760 
  
783,136 
  
has household, 0.0052  0.0057 
children and living (0.0719) (0.0753) 
without spouse, 0 
otherwise     
empstat 
0 if employed 
1,186,760 
0.6965 
783,136 
0.7006 
1 if unemployed (0.9261) (0.9259) 
2 if not in the labor force     
multjobs 
0 if no   
1,186,760 
0.0602 
783,136 
0.0597 
1 if yes   (0.2379) (0.2370) 
income  
midpoint of the 
1,077,176 
6.3146 
769,499 
6.5266 
categories of the (5.7682) (6.1356) 
average household income 
(in $10,000)     
hhsize 
number of people living 
56,449 
2.7478 
10,424 
2.7998 
in respondent's (1.5287) (1.819) 
household       
ARRA1 
ARRA assistance 
1,186,760 
0.3997 
783,136 
0.5526 
0 if year<2009, 1 
otherwise  
(0.4898) (0.4972) 
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The main explanatory variable in this framework is the number of dollars of 
SNAP benefits received by respondents. ARRA is a dummy variable for the existence of 
the ARRA increase to SNAP benefits. Ultimately, the simple OLS regression equation 
takes the form: 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽4𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝 + 𝛽5𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝
+ 𝛽6𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽7𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽8𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠
+ 𝛽10ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽11𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 +  𝑖 
where β0 is the constant and εi is the error term. Any β > 0 will increase average expected 
minutes of daily childcare while any β < 0 will decrease average expected minutes of 
daily childcare. Based on the hypothesis that SNAP will increase childcare, β1 > 0 is 
expected. Because the dependent variable is measured in minutes and the main 
explanatory variables are measured in dollars, small coefficients are expected since the 
incremental values of the variables are small. The interpretation of the main explanatory 
variables then is that an increase of $1 in subsidies changes daily childcare minutes by 
the β coefficient’s magnitude. 
 The interaction variables are multiplicative products of different dummy variables 
related to childcare. In this framework, the interaction variables are marrwsp, marrwosp, 
marrwspchild, and marrwospchild. Marrwsp is defined as a respondent being married and 
the spouse is present in the household. Marrwosp is defined as a respondent being 
married and the spouse is absent from the household. Marrwspchild and marrwospchild 
follow the same definition except with the inclusion of the presence of household 
children. These variables take on a value of 1 if all the components are satisfied for the 
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particular interaction set, 0 otherwise. This is because if any one component of the 
interaction is unsatisfied, that piece takes on a value of 0 and is multiplied through the 
entire variable, resulting in 0. For a particular respondent, some of the interaction 
variables may turn to 0. Depending on the sign of the corresponding β coefficient, this 
may increase or decrease the respondent’s expected minutes of childcare per day. At this 
point, potential data issues will be examined and discussed. 
Heteroskedasticity refers to the phenomenon where there is increased variance, σ2, 
in the error term, εi, across values of an explanatory variable. Formally, 
heteroskedasticity is defined: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟( |𝑥) ≠ 𝜎2 
One of the consequences of heteroskedasticity is incorrect standard errors. Therefore, any 
confidence intervals or statistical tests of coefficients are incorrect as well. Because of the 
survey structure related to the collection process of the data being used for this model and 
with this process of analysis, there is nothing that can be done to fix any 
heteroskedasticity if it exists in the data. Using the survey (svy) command in STATA© 
implies that the data being used are collected by a survey. Using this particular command, 
the error terms are adjusted to accommodate for the survey collection method. 
Endogeneity refers to variables that lead to biased and inconsistent estimates for 
different reasons. Most prevalent are omitted variables that are relevant to the regression, 
measurement errors, and simultaneity. The last refers to a situation where a specific 
independent variable explains the dependent variable, but the presumed dependent 
variable also explains the independent variable. In other words, the two simultaneously 
47 
explain changes in the other. This causes the estimates in the model to be biased and 
inconsistent. One way to correct endogeneity is to use an instrumental variable estimator. 
In this study, those who receive SNAP benefits may be deciding to enroll for 
reasons that impact childcare simultaneously. First, an adult may be able to sustain 
themselves on a limited diet that may not be nutritious. However, a parent may feel as 
though their child should not experience food insecurity even if the parent themselves is 
capable of doing so. Since SNAP is one way to reduce food insecurity, households with 
children, and therefore those that engage in childcare, may be more likely to enroll in 
SNAP than households where no children are present. In this way, SNAP enrollment 
could be endogenous to a model that estimates childcare.  
Another plausible reason why SNAP and childcare are endogenous is that having 
more children increases the household’s food demand, which could put strain on the 
household’s budget. This could cause some households with many children to fall to a 
level of income where they are SNAP eligible. Since there are many children in the 
household, the household adults will most likely be spending more time in daily childcare 
on average than households with fewer children. In this way, SNAP enrollment may be 
endogenous to having many children and engaging in more daily childcare on average.  
An instrumental variable, zi, is correlated with the endogenous variable, but is 
otherwise exogenous. Good instrumental variables are highly correlated with the 
endogenous explanatory variable, xi, and uncorrelated with the error term, ui. In this 
paper, the variable that is under suspicion of being endogenous is snapdoll and the 
instrument(s) are ARRA and ARRA1. The instruments ARRA and ARRA1 are formally 
defined as follows: 
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𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴1 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 < 2009 
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴1 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ≥ 2009 
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴 = 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴1 ∗ 𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙 
The final condition for instrumental variables is that the instrument does not 
belong in the original regression equation. Variables that belong in the regression 
equation that are used as instruments introduce omitted variable bias. The formalized 
versions of these the relationships are defined as follows: 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑧, 𝑥) ≠ 0 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑧, 𝑢) = 0 
If these conditions are met, the instrumental variable is valid. ARRA is related to SNAP 
because one part of the ARRA was explicitly to increase the level of SNAP benefits. 
Because of this, ARRA and snapdoll should shift in the same direction at the same time. 
In addition, ARRA does not have any direct impact on childcare, so it is exogenous to the 
model. For these reasons, ARRA is an acceptable instrument for the snapdoll variable in 
this study. There are different statistical tests that test for evidence of endogeneity and 
valid instrumental variables. 
 The Hausman test for endogeneity is used in an OLS regression in which 
endogeneity is in question. The Hausman test provides statistical evidence a variable is 
exogenous. Similar to the Sargan test, the null hypothesis for the Hausman test is 
exogeneity and the alternative hypothesis is endogeneity. The assumption in this 
endogeneity test is that the variable is exogenous. 
 In order to perform a Hausman test, the first step is to run the OLS model 
including the instrument and the potential endogenous variable as right-hand-side 
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variables. Then predict fitted values for the possible endogenous variable and the 
residuals from the OLS model. In a second-stage regression, the predicted values for the 
potential endogenous variable are used in place of the variable itself. From this point, the 
instrument is kept out, the possible endogenous variable is put back into the regression, 
and the predicted residuals are used as another right-hand-side variable. A test for 
significance of the residual coefficient is a test of exogeneity. The magnitude of the test 
statistic in this case is irrelevant for comparison to other models after the p-value is 
calculated because of varying degrees of freedom. 
The Sargan test for validity is used in a two-stage least square instrumental 
variable regression when there are more instrumental variables than potential endogenous 
variables. The Sargan test suggests instruments are valid by providing statistical evidence 
that they are uncorrelated with the predicted residuals. The null hypothesis for the Sargan 
test is that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the predicted residuals and are 
therefore valid. The alternative hypothesis is that the instrumental variables are correlated 
with the predicted residuals, and the estimates they provide are statistically invalid. It is 
important to note that because the null hypothesis is validity of the instruments, the 
assumption is that the instruments being used in the overidentification are valid.  
In order to perform a Sargan test, the first step is to run the OLS model including 
the instruments and predict the residual values. These residuals are then regressed on the 
same right-hand-side variables as the OLS. In essence, the dependent variable has been 
replaced with the predicted residuals. The resulting estimates from this regression are 
then tested for statistical significance with a Sargan test statistic. The test determines 
whether the reduced form regression estimates are statistically different from zero. The 
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degrees of freedom are calculated by subtracting the number of instruments that are 
overidentifying the suspected endogenous variable less one for the endogenous variable 
itself. In this instance, there are two instrumental variables for one potential endogenous 
variable so there is one degree of freedom. The magnitude of the test statistic in this case 
is irrelevant for comparison to other models after the p-value is calculated because of 
varying degrees of freedom. Though the Sargan test can provide statistical evidence to 
support the exogeneity of overidentified instrumental variables, it cannot indicate which 
of the instruments is most valid. 
 There are some shortcomings for the models reported in the previous section. 
There are models that include two instrumental variables, ARRA1 and ARRA. The latter 
of these two is not used in a separate model as a single instrument because of how it is 
defined. Not only does only take on a value of 1 starting in 2009 like ARRA1 does, but it 
also only takes on a value of 1 when there is SNAP enrollment. In this way, ARRA is a 
function of the potentially endogenous variable: 
𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴 = 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴1 ∗ 𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙 
Therefore, it may not meet the criteria for being an acceptable instrumental variable as it 
is not only correlated with the potential endogenous variable but is defined as a function 
of the variable it is intended to instrumentalize. This could lead to endogenous correlation 
between the instrument and the potentially endogenous variable instead of exogenous 
correlation. However, ARRA is included in the analysis and reported in this paper 
because of the Sargan test for validity for overidentified 2SLS models. The Sargan test 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments. Therefore, the overidentified 
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model has statistical evidence to show that it is valid, even with one of the instruments 
being defined as a function of the potentially endogenous variable snapdoll. 
This paper utilizes both an OLS model and a 2SLS model in order to estimate the 
partial effect of snapdoll on daily childcare. Based on the Hausman and Sargan tests, 
respectively, OLS is statistically valid. Both models are reported in this paper because the 
p-values associated with the Hausman and Sargan test statistics are close to the threshold 
of statistical significance for rejecting the null hypothesis of exogeneity at the 90% 
significance level, or a critical alpha value of α = 0.1. This implies that the statistical 
evidence provided by either model is moderate, not strong. Also, the statistical tests, 
though they provide evidence that both models are valid, do not suggest which best 
portrays the intended partial effect of snapdoll on average daily childcare. 
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RESULTS 
This chapter reports the results of all the statistical models used for analysis to 
investigate the effects on daily childcare, interprets coefficients, and shows which 
coefficients were found to be statistically significant. Table 7 lists the results found in the 
OLS models, and Table 8 lists the results found in the 2SLS models. Note that in Table 8, 
the variable listed snapdoll has been instrumented. 
Model 1 in Table 7 is the simplest naive OLS regression relationship between 
minutes spent in childcare on a daily basis and the magnitude of SNAP assistance 
received by a household. This regression uses the larger sample from the ATUS before 
restricting the subsample to only include households that are SNAP eligible based on 
household income. The maximum household income for SNAP eligibility is at or below 
130% of the poverty line, so the subsample includes households whose income does not 
exceed 130% of the poverty line. The coefficient for snapdoll implies that for every 
additional dollar of SNAP assistance, the household is able to engage in another 
0.0993631 minutes, about six seconds, of childcare per day. Put another way, an 
additional $10 of assistance allows for another minute spent in daily childcare, on 
average. 
Model 2 in Table 7 is the naive OLS regression relationship between minutes 
spent in childcare on a daily basis and the magnitude of SNAP assistance received by a 
household that is restricted to the subsample which only includes households that are 
SNAP eligible based on household income. The coefficient for snapdoll implies that an 
additional dollar of SNAP assistance, the household is able to engage in another 
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0.1332499 minutes of childcare per day. Put another way, an additional $7.50 of 
assistance allows for another minute spent in daily childcare, on average. 
Model 3 in Table 7 is the OLS regression which includes all the right-hand-side 
independent variables from the general form in the previous section. The coefficient for 
snapdoll would imply that for every additional dollar of SNAP assistance, ceteris peribus, 
the household is able to engage in another 0.07 minutes of childcare per day. The specific 
form as the result of the OLS model is given as follows: 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑂𝐿𝑆 =  9.251968 + (0.0716397 ∗ 𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙) − (0.7339277 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒)
+ (22.42056 ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥) − (5.655668 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝)
− (8.615675 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝) + (51.50522 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑)
+ (23.15323 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑) + (3.382499 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡)
− (13.08805 ∗ 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠) + (3.887812 ∗ ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) − (3.741196
∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) 
The coefficient for age implies that an additional year of age of the respondent, ceteris 
peribus, the household averages 0.74 fewer minutes of childcare per day than the average 
household. The coefficient for sex implies that for female respondents, ceteris peribus, 
the household averages 22.42 more minutes of childcare per day than the average 
household.  The coefficient for marrwsp implies that for households where the 
respondents are married, ceteris peribus, the household averages 5.66 fewer minutes of 
childcare per day than the average household. The coefficient for marrwosp implies that 
for households where the respondents are married but not together, ceteris peribus, the 
household averages 8.62 fewer minutes of childcare per day than the average household. 
The coefficient for marrwspchild implies that for households where the respondents are 
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married and there is at least one child in the home, ceteris peribus, the household 
averages 51.51 more minutes of childcare per day than the average household. The 
coefficient for marrwospchild implies that for households where the respondents are 
married but not together and there is at least one child in the home, ceteris peribus, the 
household averages 23.15 more minutes of childcare per day than the average household. 
The coefficient for empstat implies that for respondents that are employed, ceteris 
peribus, the household averages 3.38 more minutes of childcare per day than the average 
household. The coefficient for multjobs implies that for respondents with at least two 
jobs, ceteris peribus, the household averages 13.09 minutes fewer of childcare per day 
than the average household. The coefficient for hhsize implies that for every additional 
person in the household, ceteris peribus, the household averages 3.89 more minutes of 
childcare per day than the average household. The coefficient for income would imply 
that for every additional dollar in household income, ceteris peribus, the household 
averages 3.74 fewer minutes of childcare per day than the average household. 
 In Model 3, the intercept is statistically significant at the 90% level. Age, 
marrwospchild, and income are statistically significant at the 95% level. Snapdoll, sex, 
marrwsp, marrwosp, marrwspchild, empstat, multjobs, and hhsize are statistically 
significant at the 99% level. 
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Table 7. OLS Results. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 
30.65662*** 23.85713*** 9.251968* 
(0.37749) (1.08899) (5.10838) 
snapdoll 
0.0993631*** 0.1332499*** 0.0716397*** 
(0.00530) (0.01027) (0.01038) 
age  
__ __ -0.7339277** 
    (0.06661) 
sex 
__ __ 22.42056*** 
    (2.06495) 
marrwsp 
__ __ -5.655668*** 
    (1.43264) 
marrwosp 
__ ______ -8.615675*** 
    (2.65575) 
marrwspchild 
__ __ 51.50522*** 
    (3.74415) 
marrwospchild 
__ __ 23.15323** 
    (11.91468) 
empstat 
__ __ 3.382499*** 
    (1.31808) 
multjobs 
__ __ -13.08805*** 
    (4.76407) 
income  
__ __ -3.741196** 
    (1.96572) 
hhsize 
__ __ 3.887812*** 
    (0.95487) 
n 47,321 8,317 8,317 
R-squared 0.0074 0.0488 0.1752 
Prob – F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 * significant at the 90% level 
 ** significant at the 95% level 
 ***significant at the 99% level 
  
Model 4 in Table 8 is the 2SLS regression which includes all the right-hand-side 
independent variables from the general form in the previous section and uses ARRA1 as 
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an instrumental variable for snapdoll. The coefficient for snapdoll would imply that for 
every additional dollar of SNAP assistance, ceteris peribus, the household averages 0.06 
fewer minutes of childcare per day. However, this coefficient is not statistically 
significant. The specific form as the result of the 2SLS model is given as follows: 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒2𝑆𝐿𝑆 =  16.51178 − (0.06163 ∗ 𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙) − (0.86168 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒)
+ (25.05667 ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥) − (9.73768 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝)
− (12.59329 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝) + (53.75938 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑)
+ (31.46213 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑) + (4.404867 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡)
− (13.5589 ∗ 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠) + (7.775969 ∗ ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) − (9.29017 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) 
 In Model 4, marrwospchild and income are statistically significant at the 95% 
level. Age, sex, marrwsp, marrwosp, marrwspchild, empstat, multjobs, and hhsize are 
statistically significant at the 99% level. The main explanatory variable snapdoll is not 
statistically significant.  
Model 5 in Table 8 is the overidentified 2SLS regression which includes all the 
right-hand-side independent variables from the general form in the previous section and 
uses ARRA1 and ARRA as instrumental variables for snapdoll. This model is 
overidentified because there are two instruments for the same potentially endogenous 
variable. The coefficient for snapdoll would imply that for every additional dollar of 
SNAP assistance, ceteris peribus, the household averages 0.05 more minutes of childcare 
per day. The specific form as the result of the 2SLS model is given as follows: 
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𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒2𝑆𝐿𝑆 =  10.46092 + (0.049192 ∗ 𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙) − (0.755201 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒)
+ (22.85954 ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥) − (6.335431 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝)
− (9.278053 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝) + (51.8806 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑)
+ (24.53688 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑) + (3.55275 ∗ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡)
− (13.16646 ∗ 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠) + (4.53529 ∗ ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) − (4.665248
∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) 
In Model 5, marrwospchild and income are statistically significant at the 95% level. 
Snapdoll, age, sex, marrwsp, marrwosp, marrwspchild, empstat, multjobs, and hhsize are 
statistically significant at the 99% level. 
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Table 8. 2SLS Results. 
Variable (4) (5) 
Intercept 
16.51178* 10.46092** 
(7.40024) (5.13061) 
Snapdoll 
-0.063163 0.049192*** 
(0.09784) (0.01322) 
age 
-0.86168*** -0.755201*** 
(0.11457) (0.06785) 
sex 
25.05667*** 22.85954*** 
(2.96138) (2.09715) 
marrwsp 
-9.73768*** -6.335431*** 
(3.33772) (1.42753) 
marrwosp 
-
12.59329*** -9.278053*** 
(3.99450) (2.65578) 
marrwspchild 
53.75938*** 51.8806*** 
(4.18495) (3.75489) 
marrwospchild 
31.46213** 24.53688** 
(13.29260) (11.85374) 
empstat 
4.404867*** 3.55275*** 
(1.49508) (1.32406) 
multjobs 
-13.5589*** -13.16646*** 
(5.02857) (4.78152) 
income 
-9.29017** -4.665248** 
(4.63204) (2.04169) 
hhsize 
7.775969*** 4.53529*** 
(3.04084) (0.99538) 
n 8317 8317 
R-squared 0.1331 0.1740 
Prob - F 0.0000 0.0000 
     * significant at the 90% level 
     ** significant at the 95% level 
     ***significant at the 99% level 
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The Hausman test for endogeneity for Model 3 resulted in a universal F-statistic 
of 2.0200 with an associated p-value of 0.1558. Since the null hypothesis is exogeneity, 
this test failed to reject the null hypothesis at the 90% significance level. The conclusion 
is that there is statistical evidence to show that snapdoll is exogenous in OLS Model 3. 
The Sargan test for validity for the overidentified Model 5 resulted in a Sargan-
statistic of 2.2349 with an associated p-value of 0.1349. Since the null hypothesis is 
validity, this test failed to reject the null hypothesis at the 90% significance level. The 
conclusion is that there is statistical evidence to show that instruments in the 
overidentified Model 5 are valid for estimating the partial effect on daily childcare. 
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DISCUSSION 
 The estimated models indicate that, with few exceptions, expected signs of 
coefficients based economic intuition hold. The following paragraphs provide some 
speculation and interpretation as to the positive and negative magnitudes of the 
coefficients in the models. 
 Models 1 and 2 are included only to show the naïve regression estimates between 
the main explanatory variable snapdoll and the dependent variable childcare. However, 
these are only included as a baseline to start from. It should be understood that the 
coefficients maybe biased as many relevant variables are omitted. 
 Model 3 has a higher R-squared value than the two previous OLS models. This 
stands to econometric reason that adding right-hand-side variables in OLS necessarily 
increases the R-squared, or fit of the model. Model 3 also has the highest R-squared value 
of any of the models reported in this paper. Snapdoll has a positive coefficient, as 
expected, because receiving a food subsidy allows parents to work less and stay in the 
household more to engage in more daily childcare, on average. As stated earlier, the 
relatively small magnitude of the coefficient is related to the small incremental values of 
the units of the dependent variable, namely minutes.  
 Age shows a negative coefficient. This could be because younger parents are 
more likely to spend more time in the household to stay with their children. It could also 
be true that younger parents are more likely to have fewer children and may feel the need 
to stay closer to a firstborn child as opposed to a third- or fourth-born child. Sex has a 
large, positive coefficient. This is because of the way the variable is coded in STATA© 
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with female being the larger discrete value. This coefficient suggests that women engage 
more in childcare than men, on average.  
 Marrwsp shows a negative coefficient. Intuition would lead to the possible 
conclusion that having a spouse in the home means that the parents can split time in 
childcare. Therefore, a negative coefficient would make sense. Marrwosp showed a larger 
negative coefficient than households where the spouse is still in the household. Again, 
economic intuition would lead to the conclusion that single parents must spend more time 
in other activities other than childcare. In this scenario, the single parent needs to work 
more in order to provide income enough to pay for food, taking time away from potential 
childcare. Marrwspchild is the largest coefficient in magnitude and the largest positive 
coefficient in Model 3. Combining the pieces of the coded multi-interaction variable, it 
makes sense that the presence of a child means that there is more childcare taking place 
in the household. Marrwospchild is positive with a smaller magnitude with the related 
variable where the spouse is still in the household. Following the logic from above, the 
presence of a child allows for more childcare and being a single parent may force the 
parent to work more, taking time away from childcare.  
 Empstat has a positive coefficient. Being employed allows for an increase in 
childcare. This could be from the security of having a job as opposed to the time involved 
in searching for a job that could take away from childcare. Multjobs has a negative 
coefficient meaning that having more than one job takes time from childcare. This makes 
sense because trying to work more with several jobs takes time away from being in the 
household and therefore potential time spent engaging in childcare. Income has a 
negative coefficient. It could be true that households with more income are more likely to 
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pay for childcare outside of the household because they have the financial ability to do 
so. This would crowd out childcare time spent in the household. The final variable is 
hhsize which has a positive coefficient. This is because more people in the household 
means that there are more individuals who can engage in childcare throughout the day. In 
addition, more household members likely means that children are present. This can take 
the form of a stay-at-home spouse or living with older generations of family members 
that stay in the household for longer periods during the day. Regardless of which avenue 
the extra childcare occurs, having more people in the household leads to the result of 
more time spent in daily childcare on average. 
 Model 4 is the 2SLS model and the only model reported where the main 
explanatory variable snapdoll has a negative coefficient. However, the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. Actually, snapdoll in Model 4 is the only variable in any of the 
models reported that is not statistically significant at the 90% level. Because of the 
statistical insignificance, the confidence interval includes 0. This means that even though 
the coefficient is negative, it is possible that the coefficient is 0 or is even positive. 
Therefore, the negative coefficient has little explanatory power in explaining the 
magnitude of childcare. So the partial effect, though possessing the wrong sign, can 
essentially be ignored when drawing conclusions.  
 Age has a negative coefficient. Similar to above, this could be because younger 
parents are more likely to stay in the household to stay with their children. It could also 
be true that younger parents are more likely to have fewer children and may feel the need 
to stay closer to a firstborn child as opposed to a third- or fourth-born child. Sex has a 
large, positive coefficient that is greater in magnitude than Model 3. The sign is because 
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of the way the variable is coded in STATA© with female being the larger discrete value. 
This coefficient suggests that women, on average, are more likely to engage in daily 
childcare than men, the same conclusion as above. 
 Marrwsp shows a negative coefficient. Intuition similar to above would lead to 
the possible conclusion that having a spouse in the home means that the parents can split 
time in daily childcare. Marrwosp should a larger negative coefficient than households 
where the spouse is still in the household, which again is true in Model 4. Again, 
economic intuition would lead to the possible conclusion that single parents may need to 
take on more burden when it comes to providing household income. Marrwspchild is the 
largest coefficient in magnitude and the largest positive coefficient in Model 4, but not as 
large as the coefficient in Model 3. Combining the pieces of the coded multi-interaction 
variable, it makes sense that the presence of a child means that there is more daily 
childcare taking place in the household. Marrwospchild is positive with a smaller 
magnitude with the related variable where the spouse is still in the household. Following 
the logic from before, the presence of a child allows for more childcare and being a single 
parent may force the parent to work more, taking time away from time spent in daily 
childcare.  
 Empstat has a positive coefficient. Being employed allows for an increase in 
daily childcare, on average. Multjobs has a negative coefficient meaning that having 
more than one job takes time from daily childcare. This makes sense because trying to 
work more with several jobs takes time away from being in the household and therefore 
potential time spent engaging in daily childcare. Income has a negative coefficient. The 
speculation as to why an income decreases daily childcare is explained above. The final 
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variable is hhsize which has a positive coefficient. Regardless of which avenue the extra 
childcare occurs, having more people in the household leads to more time spent in daily 
childcare, on average. 
 Model 5 is the overidentified 2SLS model. Snapdoll has a positive coefficient, as 
in every model except Model 4. Age shows a negative coefficient. The speculations 
above ought to be similar to above for the previous models. The sign is because of the 
way the variable is coded in STATA© with female being the larger discrete value. 
 Marrwsp shows a negative coefficient. Intuition similar to above would lead to 
the possible conclusion that having a spouse in the home means that the parents can split 
time in daily childcare. Marrwosp should a larger negative coefficient than households 
where the spouse is still in the household, which again is true in Model 5. The 
explanation is similar to the previous models. Marrwspchild is the largest coefficient in 
magnitude and the largest positive coefficient in Model 5, but not as large as the 
corresponding coefficients in the previous models. Marrwospchild is positive with a 
smaller magnitude with the related variable where the spouse is still in the household. 
Following the logic from before, the presence of a child allows for more childcare and 
being a single parent may force the parent to work more, taking time away from daily 
childcare, on average.  
 Again here, empstat has a positive coefficient. Being employed allows for an 
increase in daily childcare, on average. Multjobs has a negative coefficient meaning that 
having more than one job takes time from daily childcare, on average. The rationale is the 
same from the previous models. Income, again, has a negative coefficient. The 
speculation as to why an income decreases childcare is explained above. The final 
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variable is hhsize which has a positive coefficient. Regardless of which avenue the extra 
childcare occurs, having more people in the household leads to more time spent in daily 
childcare, on average. 
 For a supplementary investigation, the subsample was restricted to include only 
households that are SNAP eligible and have children. SNAP eligibility, again, is defined 
at households that are below 130% of the poverty line. The presence of household 
children consists of those children whose parents live in the same household. By 
restricting the sample with two qualifiers, these results control for white noise that may 
have affected the key variables in the study thus far, specifically by those households that 
are SNAP eligible that do not have children. The following table shows descriptive 
statistics. Notice that the interaction variables that included children, marrwspchild and 
marrwospchild, are now excluded as any variation in these variables is now explained by 
marrwsp and marrwosp, respectively. The only difference between the first pair of 
interaction variables and the second pair is the presence of children in the household, 
which all households do in this subsample. The inclusion of both pairs is redundant. Also 
note that the observations for each variable have decreased, reflecting the second 
qualifier to the sample. The estimation results pertaining to Model 6 and Model 7 are in 
Table 10. 
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 Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for with Child Subsample. 
Variable Definition Subsample with child 
variable 
name 
STATA coding Obs. Mean 
    (Std. Dev.) 
childcare 
daily childcare 
650,580 
41.08495 
(minutes) (88.00602) 
snapdoll 
SNAP assistance  
27,998 
22.17748 
($) (85.46133) 
age  
age of respondent 
650,580 
44.46106 
  (17.17129) 
sex 
1 if male 
650,580 
0.566255 
2 if female (0.49559) 
marrwsp 
1 if respondent is 
650,580 
0.5138953 
married and living with (0.49981) 
spouse, 0 otherwise   
marrwosp 
1 if respondent is 
650,580 
0.0144702 
married and living without (0.119419) 
spouse, 0 otherwise   
empstat 
0 if employed 
650,580 
0.6700283 
1 if unemployed (0.91188) 
2 if not in the labor force   
multjobs 
0 if no 
650,580 
0.0596499 
1 if yes (0.23684) 
income  
midpoint of the 
630,133 
  
categories of the 6.919729  
average household income (6.323024) 
(in $10,000)   
hhsize 
number of people living 
37,066 
2.781606 
in respondent's (1.55813) 
household   
ARRA1 
ARRA assistance 
650,580 
0.729134 
0 if year<2009, 1 otherwise  (0.44441) 
   
 The model to be tested is the same as presented before in this paper with childcare 
being the dependent variable and the magnitude of dollars of SNAP benefits received by 
respondents being the main explanatory variable. The right-hand-side variables are the 
same less the two redundant variables. The equation takes the following general form: 
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𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽4𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑠𝑝 + 𝛽5𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑜𝑠𝑝
+ 𝛽6𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠 + 𝛽8ℎℎ𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽9𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 +  𝑖 
All of the econometric principles explained before still apply. 
 In this subsample, the Hausman test for endogeneity is performed on the OLS 
regression. The Hausman test provides statistical evidence to support that the main 
explanatory variable snapdoll is exogenous to the model in this subsample. The universal 
F-statistic for the OLS model is 0.3700 with an associated p-value of 0.5449. The null 
hypothesis is exogeneity, so this test failed to reject the null hypothesis at the 90% 
significance level. Thus, there is strong statistical evidence to show that all variables in 
the OLS Model 6 are exogenous. 
 Model 7 is an exactly identified instrumental variable 2SLS model for comparison 
that uses the correctly coded, and therefore valid, ARRA1 as an instrument for snapdoll. 
The same rationale for SNAP benefits possibly being endogenous and ARRA1 being a 
valid instrument applies as above. An overspecified 2SLS model was tested, but the 
Sargan test for validity came back with an associated p-value of 0.0000, providing strong 
statistical evidence that the model was invalid. For this reason, the overspecified model is 
not reported for this subsample.  
 In Model 6, the intercept, empstat, multjobs, income, and hhsize are significant at 
the 95% level. Age, sex, and marrwsp are statistically significant at the 99% level. The 
main explanatory variable snapdoll is also statistically significant at the 99% level. 
Marrwosp is not statistically significant. For the OLS model, the child-contingent 
subsample differs from Model 3 reported above most notably in marrwsp which changed 
sign and is statistically significant with a greater positive magnitude than its counterpart 
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in Model 3. Most likely, this is due to the exclusion of the now redundant marrwspchild. 
Marrwosp is still negative but is no longer statistically significant. Snapdoll has a slightly 
smaller negative coefficient but did not lose statistical significance compared to Model 3. 
This would imply that the existence of household children slightly increases the average 
expected minutes of daily childcare, which stands to reason. If there are children, there is 
more childcare, on average. Age has a slightly smaller negative magnitude but is now 
more statistically significant. The coefficient for sex increased in positive magnitude, but 
the standard error more than doubled. The statistical significance remains the same at in 
Model 3, however. Being female increases average childcare per day by a greater 
magnitude when the subsample is contingent on the existence of children. Empstat is 
larger in positive magnitude but lost some statistical significance. Multjobs increased in 
negative magnitude, but the error term is almost twice as large causing it to lose some 
statistical significance compared to Model 3. Income became greater in negative 
magnitude at the same level of statistical significance. Hhsize change sign from positive 
to negative and is still statistically significant. The intercept nearly tripled in positive 
magnitude and had a doubling of its error term but gained statistical significance in 
relation to Model 3. 
 In Model 7, the intercept, empstat, multjobs, and hhsize are statistically 
significant at the 95% level. Age, sex, and marrwsp are statistically significant at the 99% 
level. The main explanatory variable snapdoll as well as marrwosp and income are not 
statistically significant. For the 2SLS model, the child-contingent subsample differs from 
Model 4 reported most notably in marrwsp which changed sign and is statistically 
significant with a greater positive magnitude than its counterpart in Model 4. Again, this 
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is likely due to the exclusion of marrwspchild. Marrwosp changed sign, but is no longer 
statistically significant. Snapdoll became smaller in negative magnitude and is still 
statistically insignificant. The coefficient for age became slightly smaller in negative 
magnitude but remains at the same level of statistical significance. The coefficient for sex 
became about 50% larger than in Model 4, but has almost twice the standard error. Sex 
has the same level of statistical significance. Hhsize changed from positive to negative 
and is still statistically significant. Empstat became slightly larger in positive magnitude 
but lost some significance. Multjobs became slightly larger in negative magnitude but 
lost some significance. Income’s negative coefficient became smaller and is now 
statistically insignificant. The intercept is twice as large as in Model 4. 
 On balance, limiting the sample to only include households with children shifted 
the marriage interaction variables on a greater scale in absolute magnitude than the other 
right-hand-side variables. This phenomenon could be that the included marriage variables 
are now reflective of the two other marriage interaction variables that were contingent on 
childcare before the restriction of the subsample. The only variable that changed sign 
with any statistical significance is the size of the household. This could reflect that some 
households may have several additional household adults but no children. The 
households meeting that description are now excluded from the subsample contingent 
upon children. In this way, households with several household adults and no children 
could have been adding significant white noise to the estimates for childcare before the 
restricted subsample analysis. 
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  Table 10. With Child Subsample Results. 
Variable (6) (7) 
intercept 
26.33998** 33.82541** 
(11.96072) (16.76443) 
snapdoll 
0.0564669*** -0.0126403 
(0.01195) (0.11515) 
age  
-.6860414*** -.7524238*** 
(0.14368) (0.17417) 
sex 
36.27843*** 37.66865*** 
(4.55638) (5.25713) 
marrwsp 
36.18515***  34.4397*** 
(4.88367) (5.62852) 
marrwosp 
-3.619867    -2.747514    
(11.80367) (11.89139) 
empstat 
5.743416** 6.12733** 
(2.38187) (2.45636) 
multjobs 
-18.54542** -18.75308** 
(8.00615) (8.15846) 
income  
-5.447587** -8.943996    
(2.70083) (6.56721) 
hhsize 
-2.072558** -0.4184277** 
(1.33775) (3.11279) 
n 3889 3889 
R-squared 0.0599 0.0487 
Prob - F 0.0000 0.0000 
   * significant at the 90% level 
   ** significant at the 95% level 
   ***significant at the 99% level 
 This exercise in limiting the subsample is one of the ways this study can be 
expanded. By limiting the sample to control for white noise and removing redundant 
variables, the estimates from the models are more likely to reflect the actual relationship 
between variables of interest. In this case, limiting the sample to being contingent upon 
the existence of children made for several sign and significance changes. Other 
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extensions include using different linear approximations to attain estimates with more 
controls. One such way to achieve this is with a difference-in-difference model to control 
for changes in the overall economic environment over time instead of only controlling for 
changes in specific household observations over time.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The most important take away from this study is that there is evidence that 
enrollment in the Supplementary Nutrition Assistance Program increases the amount of 
time that parents can engage in childcare with their children in the household. Through 
the course of the literature review, SNAP is shown to decrease food insecurity and make 
for more successful children, both sociologically and economically, later in their lives. 
Multiple models are reported because it is impossible to determine which is most 
appropriate for determining the partial effect of SNAP enrollment on childcare. That 
being said, there is statistical evidence that both provide valid econometric arguments in 
favor of Model 5.  
 Future studies could potentially examine the differences between the proposed 
models to determine which is most appropriate for the estimation. Along those lines, 
other food subsidies whose aim is to decrease food insecurity could be examined in a 
similar framework as the one presented in this paper to determine their viability in 
increasing the amount of childcare that parents are able to take part in each day. Another 
potential study that could come from the conclusions in this paper could be to examine 
the requirements to enroll in SNAP. Specifically, investigating if food insecurity could be 
decreased in a broader range of people is certainly worth studying, especially if there are 
positive aspects such as increased daily childcare. 
 The conclusions in this paper suggest that increasing the magnitude of SNAP 
dollars is beneficial to household childcare and food security. By continuing this 
framework to investigate other food subsidies, the overall magnitude of subsidized food 
dollars could be increased. This would lead to children who are better off later in life 
even though they were raised in low income households and experienced some food 
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insecurity, which the literature shows gives them a disadvantage later in life. Political 
debates, adverse selection, and moral hazard aside, there is statistical evidence to support 
that increasing the magnitude of food subsidies is beneficial for children experiencing 
food insecurity.  
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